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he three essays in this issue focus on the 
theme of home and at-homeness. In the 
first essay, interior designer Jane Barry 
tells the story of her California family 
home. She describes family routines in the house 
and her father‘ increasing inability to live comforta-
bly at home during the last few years of his life. 
Though he became steadily more disabled, he 
would not move from the house or accept design 
modifications to make his life there easier. 
 In the second essay, health sociologist Andrew 
Moore and nursing researcher Bernie Carter con-
sider the impact of life-saving assistive technology 
(AT) that many children with complex health needs 
depend on in their homes.  In author interviews, 
parents of these children explained how this equip-
ment intrudes into the home yet is absolutely neces-
sary if the child is to remain alive. Moore and 
Carter offer no easy way to reconcile this tension 
between technological essentials and lived qualities 
of at-homeness, but their essay perceptively illus-
trates how properties of the material and technolog-
ical environment can play both a supportive and un-
dermining role in domestic wellbeing. 
In the third essay, philosopher Janet Donohoe 
overviews home and at-homeness. She draws 
on the phenomenological ideas of Gaston 
Bachelard, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, but gives particular emphasis 
to Edmund Husserl‘s concepts of homeworld 
and alienworld. Husserl interpreted home-
world as the tacit, taken-for-granted sphere 
of experiences and situations typically not 
called into question. Though unique for each 
person, the homeworld is always in some 
mode of lived mutuality with the alien-
world—a world of difference and otherness 
but only brought forward to awareness be-
cause of the always already givenness of the 
homeworld. In the last part of her essay, Donohoe 
considers what these concepts might mean for con-
sidering the experience of ―displaced‖ peoples and 
for answering the question of whether an alien place 
can ever take on the normative identity of home 
place. 
One of phenomenology‘s major contributions 
to contemporary thinking is recognition that human 
beings and their worlds are existentially intertwined 
and that an integral aspect of this interconnected-
ness is how particular physical, environmental, and 
spatial qualities of a world make that world one way 
rather than another. In referring to environmental 
features like dwelling layout, technological devices, 
landscapes, and geographical worlds, these essays 
illustrate how materiality, spatiality, and environ-
mental embodiment contribute to specific domestic 
lifeworlds. Directly or indirectly, the essays suggest 
how such understanding might facilitate more life-
grounded theories, designs, and policies. 
  
 
Below: One house in a 1938 booklet of American house plans. 
In her essay beginning on p. 4, Jane Barry describes her fa-
ther‘s living in this house for 65 years and the environmental 
difficulties he faced in the last several months of his life there. 
T 
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More Donors, 2012 
We are grateful to readers who, since the winter is-
sue, have contributed more than the base subscrip-
tion for 2012. 
 
John Baker     Tom Barrie 
Louise Chawla     Robert Habiger 
Susan Ingham     Sara Ishikawa 
Karen Kho     Patricia Locke 
Anne Niemiec     Hanalei Rozen 
Phil Stafford     Ingrid Leman Stefanovic 
Heather Thoma & Paul Salanki  Ray Weisenburger 
 
EAP Symposium at EDRA, Seattle 
The 43
rd
 annual meeting of the Environmental De-
sign Research Association (EDRA) will be held 
May 30–June 2, 2012, at the Renaissance Seattle 
Hotel, Seattle. EAP is sponsoring a symposium, 
―Challenges for Qualitative Methods and Ap-
proaches in Environment-Behavior Research: Ide-
ology, Ethics, and Understanding Phenomena.‖  
Presenters include Lynne C. Manzo, Associate Pro-
fessor Department of Landscape Architecture, Col-
lege of Built Environments, University of Washing-
ton, Seattle; Jeremy C. Wells, Assistant Professor, 
Historic Preservation Program, School of Architec-
ture, Art and Historic Preservation, Roger Williams 
University, Bristol, Rhode Island; and EAP editor 
David Seamon. www.edra.org/. 
 
Items of Interest 
The 4
th
 annual meeting of the Interdisciplinary 
Coalition of North American Phenomenologists 
will be held May 25–27, 2012, at New York City‘s 
Fordham University. The theme of the conference is 
―Interdisciplinarity beyond the Academy: Lived 
Worlds of Consequence for Academic Work.‖ 
www.icnap.org/; jmartinez@asu.edu. 
 
Aesthetics and Ethics of Architecture and the 
Environment is a conference to be held July 11–13, 
2012, at Newcastle University, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, United Kingdom. The conference aim is to 
broaden aesthetic discourse ―beyond questions re-
lating to purely visual phenomena to include those 





 annual meeting of the International Asso-
ciation for Environmental Philosophy will be 
held at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Rochester, New 
York, November 3–5, 2012. This event follows the 
annual meetings of the Society for Phenomenology 
and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) and the Socie-
ty for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences 
(SPHS). www.environmentalphilosophy.org/2012cfp.html. 
 
The Nature Institute in upstate New York is spon-
soring two Goethean-science seminars this summer: 
―The World of Color and Light‖ (June 17–23, 
2012); and ―Coming to our Senses‖ (July 8–14, 
2012). The second seminar aims to explore how the 
different senses facilitate different modes of seeing 
and understanding. info@natureinstitute.org. 
 
Citations Received 
Christopher Klemek, 2011. The Transatlan-
tic Collapse of Urban Renewal Postwar Ur-
banism from New York to Berlin. Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press. 
 
From the introduction: ―The attempts to impose a new order 
on cities, and specifically a modernist vision of urbanism, via 
urban renewal policies eventually engendered a fierce back-
lash… that extended from North America to Western Europe. 
Instead of such sweeping approaches to cities, writer Jane Ja-
cobs joined a younger generation of New Left urbanists to 
advocate a house-to-house approach, both for organizing 
grassroots resistance, and for a gentler, graduate renewal of 
cities…. Suddenly, the once vigorously contested boundary 
that had characterized the urban policy favored by many liber-
al reformers, with its clear demarcations, became a vanishing 
frontier, and gave way instead to a more complicated condi-
tion. Old political, conceptual, and even economic categories 
fell apart; old battle lines disengaged…. The American urban 
frontier was effectively abandoned by the 1970s, when Presi-
dent Richard Nixon took a declare-victory-and-retreat ap-
proach by dismantling all urban renewal programs.‖ 
 
Jeff Malpas, 2012. Heidegger and the Think-
ing of Place: Explorations in the Topology 
of Being. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Expanding arguments in his earlier Heidegger‘s Topology, this 
philosopher examines the place aspects of Heidegger‘s 
thought. Malpas suggests that ―philosophy begins in wonder 
and beings in place and the experience of place. The place of 










Linda Finlay, 2011. Phenomenology for 
Therapists: Researching the Lived World. 
Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Though this psychotherapist directs her discussion 
to therapists, her presentation of the nature of phe-
nomenology and phenomenological methods pro-
vides a lucid introduction for anyone interested 
phenomenology. The first part of the book provides 
an accessible overview of phenomenology broadly 
and then highlights specific aspects of the ―phe-
nomenological project,‖ which Finlay explicates in 
terms of six central themes: 
 
1. A focus on lived experience and meanings; 
2. The use of robust, thorough descriptions of ex-
periences, situations, and events as lived; 
3. A concern with existential issues; 
4. The intertwinement of people and world; 
5. The use of the ―phenomenological attitude,‖ 
which includes bracketing and reflexivity; 
6. A potentially transformative relational ap-
proach. 
 
In the second part of the book, Finlay explicates 
six specific phenomenological methods, which she 
identifies as: 
 
 descriptive empirical phenomenology; 
 hermeneutic phenomenology; 
 lifeworld approaches; 
 interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA); 
 first-person approaches; 
 reflexive-relational approaches. 
 
Finlay first describes each of these methods 
broadly and then highlights specific research studies 
and potential strengths and weaknesses. The last 
part of the book considers ―phenomenological 
methods in practice‖ and delineates some general 
principles for doing phenomenological research, 
including chapters on gathering and interpreting 
experiential descriptions. 
Finlay‘s book is exceptionally valuable in the 
way it provides a comprehensive and understanda-
ble introduction to phenomenology broadly and to 
specific phenomenological principles, notions, and 
research methods. An excellent introduction for 
phenomenological beginners. See sidebar, right. 
  
 
 From Phenomenology for Therapists 
The aim of phenomenology is to describe the lived 
world of everyday experience. Lived experience can be 
general, such as what being a therapist is like, or else 
specific, such as being pregnant, dying of cancer, or 
having a sense of ‗losing one‘s footing‘ after a trauma. 
Phenomenological research into individual experiences 
gives insight into, and understanding of, the human con-
dition. Sometimes it languages things we already know 
tacitly but have not articulated in depth. At other times 
quite surprising insights reveal themselves…. 
     Phenomenological research is potentially trans-
formative for both researcher and participant. It offers 
individuals the opportunity to be witnessed in their ex-
perience and allows them to ‗give voice‘ to what they 
are going through. It also opens new possibilities for 
both researcher and researched to make sense of the ex-
perience in focus (p. 10). 
 
Phenomenology… discloses, transforms and inspires. 
That is why it excites me, why I am passionate about it. 
It is not just a research method. It offers a way of both 
being in and of seeing the world from inside and out. It 
is not just an intellectual project; it is a life practice. It is 
concerned with the discovery and celebration of our 
own immersion in body-world experience. The phe-
nomenological project calls the researcher to be reflec-
tively open to connecting with the phenomenon in all its 
complexity. When I do phenomenological research, I 
immerse myself in wonder and awe of the other‘s expe-
rience. I want to be caught up inside that experience. 
Through it, I become enchanted and fascinated with the 
ambiguity, multiple layers and mysterious paradoxical 
depths of human existence. 
 The strength of this method lies in its ability to 
bring to life the richness of existence through descrip-
tion of what may appear at first sight to be ordinary, 
mundane living. The magic comes when we focus so 
deeply on aspects of individuals‘ ordinary lives we see 
that what is revealed is, inevitably, something special; 
something more. What is revealed is actually quite    
extra-ordinary (p. 26). 
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My Dad’s Story: 




Barry is an interior designer whose professional work focuses on ―aging in place.‖  She earned a master‘s de-
gree in Interior Design from Washington State University in 2008. This essay is a revised version of a chapter 
from her graduate thesis, which focuses on home modifications for older people. In an email, she explains how 
her late father played a central role in her finding a professional focus: ―My father put me on this path, and I 
think about him almost every day. I remember how hard his last months were, and I think I didn‘t do enough for 
him… I wasn‘t kind enough. But, he was so difficult to deal with! He didn‘t want anything different in his envi-
ronment. He just wanted things, including himself, to be the way they always were.‖ jbarryd@q.com. Text and 
illustrations © 2012 Jane Barry. 
 
 
s I stayed with my father in the last few 
months before his death, I observed his 
declining ability to function, his intense 
attachment to his home (photograph, 
right), and his refusal to consider changes to make 
life easier. His deepening difficulties made me 
aware of the power of habit in human lives—its 
rootedness in the body and the lived experience of 
moving in and through the home. In my thesis in 
interior design, I decided to explore how these ideas 
might help in envisioning home modifications for 
aging in place [1].   
Drawing on my dad‘s experience as well as the 
aging literature and interviews with other elders, I 
developed two design guidelines to direct a theoret-
ical remodeling of my dad‘s home: First, to preserve 
the familiar; and, second, to design for the senses. 
Both guidelines require a focus on the experiential 
qualities of moving into and throughout a home. 
One pays heed to level changes, the direction of cir-
culation, and shifts in spatial volumes—for exam-
ple, moving from a small, low-ceilinged entry into a 
cathedral-ceilinged living room.  
In my dad‘s case, I considered his habit of 
fetching supplies from the basement, a regular be-
havior involving the familiar experience of descend-
ing and ascending, in all its physical, personal, and 
cultural meanings. I decided that he would inevita-
bly make these trips down and up the basement 
stairs. What I could do was to make this action saf-
er. I planned a hand rail along each side, and a high-
contrast edging on each step—common practice but 
now deeply meaningful. So it is that my father‘s 
struggles guide my professional life today. 
My dad‘s life was deeply rooted in his home. 
For that reason, I want to honor him and focus on 
that attachment. The meaning of place played a 
strong role in his behaviors and the choices he 
made, and in his resistance to making changes in his 
environment. For example, even after I had placed 
canned goods upstairs in a kitchen cupboard where I 
thought they would be more convenient for him, he 
persistently made trips down to the basement even 
as he faced declining strength, energy, and balance. 
His behavior regularly baffled me. 
A 
4





 For part of a year, I lived 
with my father and helped him 
as his health failed. He had oc-
cupied his home for 65 years. 
Understandably, his wish was to 
die at home. Over time, I ob-
served his fervent desire to re-
main in that house and his diffi-
culty in almost every task. But 
he refused to make changes. It 
seemed that he couldn‘t (or 
wouldn‘t) imagine what helpful 
changes might be possible. I 
labeled my father‘s behavior 
―stubborn.‖ But before I lay out 
my deepening understanding of 
his situation, let me set the stage 
and tell the history that shaped 
his house at 516 G Street, Da-
vis, California. 
 
History of a House 
My dad was a third-generation California boy. His 
grandparents came West in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury and settled in the Napa Valley. My father grew 
up in and around St. Helena, California, where his 
father was a ranch hand but apparently not very 
good at keeping a job. My dad didn‘t talk about his 
dad very much. I suspect his dad was a rowdy 
Irishman, with all its unseemly connotations. 
As a young man, my dad moved to Davis, 75 
miles to the east. He worked in a Purity grocery 
store and for the Southern Pacific Railroad as a 
crossing guard. In the tower at night, he studied for 
the civil-service examination and soon secured a job 
at the Davis post office. He started as a mail carrier, 
spent time as a clerk, and eventually became Davis‘ 
postmaster. He retired in 1975 at age 59.  
When my dad moved to Davis in 1937, he lived 
in a boarding house on the corner of Fourth and F 
Streets. Two blocks away and two years later at the 
age of 22, he contracted to have a house built for 
himself and his mother, who was now divorced. I 
believe that this new house embodied all the hopes 
and dreams of his life up to that point. The house 
was security in the face of uncertain economic 
times. Ownership meant that he was now head of 
the family. 
The house was a two-bedroom ―cottage.‖ The 
plans came from a 1938 pamphlet, ―New Small 
Homes,‖ published by the L. F. Garlinghouse Com-
pany of Topeka, Kansas.  The house is described in 
the rather flowery language of the time as ―a lovely 
little cottage somewhat on the Cape Cod order‖ 
(plan, above). There was a basement as well as an 
attic—features unusual for Davis, even in 1939. The 
cost of the 1000-square-foot dwelling was 
$3,732.00, according to all the original paperwork 
he saved in a file. To finance the house, my dad bor-
rowed from his mother‘s brother, Uncle Neely. He 
made the final payback payment in 1958. 
In 1941, my father entered the army and, dur-
ing World War II, his divorced father and mother 
lived in the home. His father stayed in the attic. I 
would guess that my grandmother allowed it be-
cause he had nowhere else to go. He died in the 
home in 1950. My father recalls hearing him up-
stairs coughing. 
When my mother and father were married in 
1951, they moved ten miles east to Sacramento, and 
my grandmother stayed in the house alone. She be-
came ill in 1958, and my dad had a laundry and an-
other bedroom and bath added to the rear of the 
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house so we could move in to care for her (see plan, 
p. 10). I spent my school years from first grade 
through high school at 516 G Street.  
Including the addition, the house was about 
1,850 square feet in size. My parents and I had the 
two front bedrooms and my grandmother had the 
new space in the back. She passed on in 1960, when 
I was eight, so we didn‘t all live together very long. 
After her death, I moved into her bedroom, and the 
front bedroom became an office. 
  
Describing the House 
The house at 516 G Street was essentially a back-
wards ―L‖ shape, with sleeping and bathroom areas 
at each end of the structure and living and eating 
areas at the center. The kitchen was galley style—
long and thin, widening into a dining area at the 
north end. The kitchen functioned as a food-
preparation and eating area. It also served as a cor-
ridor from the front of the house to the back. In the 
winter, my parents closed front and back doors and 
heated the kitchen with its stove—a Wedgewood 
model with four gas burners and a wood-burning 
compartment, installed when the house was built 
(photograph, above right). 
The house had no central-heating system. In-
stead, there was a gas floor heater between the liv-
ing room and front hall serving the original parts of 
the house. The back addition was warmed by a wall 
heater between the laundry room and rear bedroom. 
My dad never had the heating system upgraded, and 
the complicated process of lighting pilot lights was 
one of his seasonal routines. He kept a record of the 
dates when he turned the pilot lights on and off. 
There were three entries to the house: a west 
front door into the living room; a north side door 
into the kitchen; and an east back door from the 
backyard into the laundry, each with a screen door 
and two steps up. In the back yard, my dad built a 
concrete-paver patio that, over the years, became 
lumpy and uneven. About five years before he died, 
my dad put grab handles on the outside frames of 
the side and back doors to help my mother climb the 
steps, but he did not erect any entry railings. The 
screen doors made entry somewhat complicated as 
my parents aged because they had to hold the screen 
doors open while unlocking the entry door. 
The house had hardwood floors in the living 
room, bedrooms, and hallway. The kitchen floor 
was linoleum. A stairway off the kitchen led down 
to the basement, and along the top of the basement 
wall my father stored canned goods, potatoes, and 
onions. There was an open crawl space between the 
ground and the sub-flooring where one could see 
soft, powdery dirt in all directions. Originally, the 
basement stair had no railing, but after my dad had 
a stroke in 1999, he had a handrail installed. Under-
neath the stair was a workshop where he kept tools, 
hardware, paint and household cleaners, fishing and 
camping equipment, and things he might need, like 
jars. These he used as containers for nuts and bolts 
that he neatly sorted according to size and purpose. 
He never disposed of a jar, bottle, can, bag, or box! 
The attic stair was in the front hall off the living 
room, between the two bedrooms. This stair had a 
single railing. In the attic were trunks of old clothes, 
boxes of old letters, papers and documents, a few 
pieces of old furniture, and lots of dust.  Neither the 
basement nor the attic was finished: The basement 
walls were plain concrete, and the attic had no insu-
lation—just bare studs and rafters. In fact, none of 
the house‘s walls were insulated. 
The front bedrooms each had two sets of dou-
ble-hung windows that provided lots of light and 
fresh air. During summer nights, we opened these 
windows to let in the cooling ―delta breeze.‖ During 
the day, we shut them early, pulled the shades, and 
relied on the outside awnings to protect the inside 
from the hot summer sun. The house stayed re-
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markably cool unless there was a run of 100-plus-
degree days and no nighttime breeze. 
A short hall led from the kitchen to the back 
addition, past a storage closet and bedroom to the 
left, bathroom to the right, and into the laundry. 
Here was the washer, dryer, and washtub. The 
washer‘s rinse cycle emptied into the tub: a hose 
was hooked over the side. More than once, my 
mother left a sock in the tub, the drain clogged, and 
water overflowed into the room.  
Light filled this room because of its north and 
west windows. We blocked the summer heat with an 
outside bamboo shade.  The laundry was a large 
room and storage space for various devices and fur-
nishings:  a second refrigerator, a bookcase, a built-
in linen closet, and a dining room table where my 
mother folded clothes and set up her sewing ma-
chine for mending. When we had guests, we could 
put leaves in the table and extend it to seat eight or 
ten. In this way, the laundry room was transformed 
into a dining room for holidays. My dad mounted a 
beam with curtains that, when pulled, hid the wash-
er, dryer, and refrigerator. 
 
My Dad’s Routines 
My dad was in his prime during my high school 
years. His typical day went like this. The family 
would awake around 6:45 a.m., and my parents 
would go into the kitchen. My mother would light 
the oven and open the oven door to heat the room. 
My dad started a fire in the stove firebox to burn 
junk mail, milk cartons, and other discards. He 
would use the front bathroom getting ready for 
work while my mother made breakfast we ate at the 
dinette table.  We then went on our ways to work 
and school. My dad walked to work, only about 
three blocks away. My mother and I rode our 
bikes—she to her job at the University library and I 
to the high school.  
Dad came home for lunch, which I prepared for 
him when I was home during the summers. After 
work my mother fed the five cats, balancing five 
plates in her arms from the kitchen out to the back 
door, sometimes with cats underfoot. Shortly after, 
my parents would have their five o‘clock cocktail 
hour. If the weather was nice, they would sit outside 
in the back yard. Then they watched the television 
news in the living room, my mother fixed dinner, 
and we ate in the dinette. My dad often went into 
the home office after dinner to take care of bills and 
other paper work. My mom read on the couch in the 
living room, and I did homework in my room or at 
the dinette table.  
My dad‘s spaces were the office, the basement, 
and the detached garage on the north side of the 
house. My mother rarely ventured into these spaces. 
There was frequently something that needed fixing: 
window screens replaced, awnings put up or taken 
down, pilot lights turned off or on, and so forth. My 
dad did these things himself, using tools and sup-
plies he kept in the basement or garage.  
He also made sure cupboards and drawers were 
stocked. He kept the kitchen supplied with staples. 
In the basement, he stored bulk sugar, flour, and rice 
in large jars. From this stock as needed, he would 
refill smaller jars in the kitchen cupboards. This 
way of separating bulk storage and the daily sup-
plies necessitated my father‘s making many trips up 
and down stairs or from the front of the house to the 
back. At the rear of the laundry room, he made piles 
of things to save or tend to later, like newspapers 
and magazines. For my dad, there was never a di-
rect route from package to use or from storage to 
garbage. Rather, there was always an in-between, 
―holding‖ stage, which used multiple spaces and 
made for a certain amount of clutter. This was not a 
difficulty for him when he was younger, but as he 
got older and had to struggle just to get up from a 
chair, it was exhausting. 
 
Physical and Functional Changes 
When I left home for college in 1970, my parents 
had retired and were active and involved with travel 
and the community. They spent more than 30 years 
of their lives in retirement. Travel was their passion, 
but when at home in Davis, they joined in meals, 
classes, and social gatherings at the Senior Center 
and did volunteer work in the community and the 
church. My mother swam several times a week 
throughout her life, and both mom and dad walked 
with friends regularly.  
Gradually, my dad absorbed my bedroom into 
his territory as he stashed clothes and other things 
throughout the house. The house seemed to become 
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more and more his and less and less my mother‘s. I 
believe she never felt that the place was hers.  She 
had wanted a dishwasher and an air conditioner, but 
my dad always said no. She was tired of the old-
fashioned amenities and ready to move to a retire-
ment village when she reached age 85. My parents 
considered various facilities, but my dad would not 
budge from his home.  My mother died two and a 
half years before he did. She was 95 and eight years 
his senior.  
Not too much changed about the way my dad 
used the house after her death. He left my mom‘s 
clothes in her dresser and in the closet and her many 
family pictures and swimming ribbons on the walls. 
He began to use her bed, next to his in their bed-
room, for piling clothes and sitting while dressing.  
He had several chronic health conditions. His 
vision was always poor, and he could barely see out 
of his left eye due to a long-standing optic nerve 
anomaly. He‘d had a stroke in 1999 when he was 
82. He recovered most of his function but was left 
with a shuffling gait and some weakness and numb-
ness in his left arm and hand.  These problems 
worsened over the last seven years of his life as he 
became more fatigued and stiff. He took medica-
tions for high blood pressure and a heart arrhyth-
mia. 
He was finally diagnosed with Parkinson‘s dis-
ease, and all these impairments contributed to a 
slowness of movement and an increasing inability 
to grasp objects. He had difficulty holding objects 
with his left hand and dropped things constantly. He 
had trouble opening containers, using tools and 
utensils, or manipulating buttons and zippers. The 
ability to grasp is critical, and I believe this disabil-
ity caused him more grief than his declining 
strength and loss of balance and flexibility.  
 
Bathroom and Kitchen Difficulties 
In the front bathroom, the hot and cold sink spigots 
were twisting knobs that required a grasp. There 
was little space around the sink to set things. The 
light over the mirrored medicine cabinet had an 
on/off pull chain requiring a reach above shoulder 
level. Rather than a shower, my dad took sponge 
baths because the tub‘s shower valve had been bro-
ken for years. He tried to fix it but couldn‘t grasp 
the pliers tightly enough to turn the stem. The toilet 
paper dispenser was to the toilet‘s left, which was 
his weaker side, so he kept a paper roll on the sink 
in front of him. This was an easy reach for his right 
hand but took up space on the small vanity. 
As it became more difficult, he would shave 
only every few days. Getting dressed in jeans and 
shirt took him two hours. Physically, it was difficult 
to pull a t-shirt over his head or pull up pants with 
one hand. Mentally, these changes in his physical 
capabilities confused and depressed him. He didn‘t 
strategize but, rather, blamed the object or the situa-
tion: ―These damn buttons….why are they so 
small?!‖ ―These damn jars….why do they put the 
lids on so tight?!‖ 
 
Having Breakfast 
In the kitchen, his habits and room configuration 
required that he make multiple trips across the room 
between refrigerator and dinette table and between 
sink and stove. Multi-tasking and efficiency were 
never his style. He did one thing at a time.  
My dad always had tea and usually, hot cereal, 
for breakfast. He kept several varieties of loose tea 
in the cupboard to the right of the sink. He stored 
the tea in labeled, easy-to-handle tins and kept the 
original packages in the basement. To boil water, he 
used a Revere Ware tea kettle, lightweight, fillable 
through the spout, and thus requiring no lid. He kept 
the teapot in the cupboard to the left of the sink. He 
―scalded‖ the pot before he put in the tea.   
To move between sink and stove required turn-
ing around and crossing a four-foot space. For 
workspace, he used the counter top, or ―sink board,‖ 
as he called it. He also used the stove surface, since 
iron lids covered the wood burner and the unused 
gas burners. The oven top served as storage for 
utensils, honey, and salt and pepper.  
In making tea, he placed the teapot near the 
sink, walked across to get the kettle off the stove, 
then returned to the sink to scald the teapot with 
boiling water. Then he emptied the scalded pot into 
the sink, measured tea into the pot, poured in more 
boiling water, and placed the teapot in the open ov-
en (across from him, at waist level) to steep. He did 
all these interconnected actions with one hand.  
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Next, he would prepare his oatmeal, grits, or 
cream of wheat. Moving back and forth across the 
room, he would bring water from sink to stove, and 
take containers and utensils from cupboard and 
drawer. When the cereal was ready, he put it in a 
bowl, which he placed on the table. He then put tea-
pot, two cups, and strainer on the table and moved 
to the refrigerator to get orange juice, which he 
poured into a glass and took to the table. 
It was a considerable distance from refrigerator 
to table—about 12 feet. The refrigerator door swung 
to the right, out into the room, and the work area 
was across the room. To open the door with his right 
hand required removing items with his unreliable 
left hand. He then had to pivot left to place items on 
the counter about four feet behind him. After carry-
ing the orange juice to the table, he would make an-
other trip to the refrigerator to get milk and carry 
the quart carton to the table. He chose to sit facing 
west, a vantage point to the street. This placement 
required that he go round to the table‘s far side. Af-
ter he ate, he left dishes and milk out and moved to 
the living room, where he sat in his favorite chair 
with a heating pad on his shoulders.  
This breakfast-time routine was complicated 
and exhausting for my dad. He would hold onto 
kitchen chairs as he moved around the table. He 
would keep a hand on the counter as he traversed 
the length of kitchen. Suffering numbness as well as 
weakness, he would lose his grip and frequently 
drop utensils, pots, and pans during his last months 
of life. He knocked things over. He cleaned up after 
himself less and less because it was too tiring and 
too much more than he could do. 
Mental inflexibility added to my dad‘s physical 
problems. He was unable to change his habits or to 
adapt his taken-for-granted actions to his deepening 
disability.  He wanted the house to stay as it always 
was, even when that made it almost impossible for 
him. He became angry when I moved some canned 
goods from the basement to a lazy Susan in the 
kitchen cupboard. Rather than use the stores there, 
he would continue to go downstairs, precariously 
clutching the basement stair railing. 
In a few instances, he did make things easier 
for himself. He kept pliers, magnifying glasses, and 
flashlights strategically placed throughout the 
house—front, center, and rear. I provided him with 
a large-button phone, and he kept a portable phone 
by his bed at night, although the cradle remained in 
the front office because there was no bedroom 
phone jack. He called a handyman from the senior 
center to change light bulbs. As time went on, he 
asked a family friend, Nyla, to do banking and gro-
cery shopping for him. Eventually, when she dis-
covered that items she‘d purchased were spoiling in 
the refrigerator, Nyla arranged for deliveries from 
Meals on Wheels.  
 
Self and Place 
My dad‘s identity was so bound up in his home that 
I‘m not sure he differentiated between self and 
place in the weeks before his death. He did have 
some dementia and was consumed with visions of 
disasters at 516 G Street. Several times he asked me 
to call 911 to report an imagined fire or theat. An-
other time he demanded to leave the house and 
move to a hotel. The day before he died, he had a 
moment of clarity and apologized for all his worry 
and outbursts.  
Participating in my dad‘s home situation in the 
last few months of his life has been a revelatory ex-
perience. I have been moved and inspired by his 
attachment to home, by his ―stubbornness,‖ by his 
struggles and suffering, and by his unwillingness to 
accept his declining heath. I did the best I could to 
help him. And I continue to remember him as I help 
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Re-Envisioning a House 
n her thesis, Barry (2008) envisioned a redesign 
of her father‘s house that might have better ac-
commodated his physical and mental decline. 
Below are her revamped floor plan for the house 
and computer renderings of proposed changes for 









The Place of Assistive Technologies in the 
Homes and Lives of Families with a Child with 
Complex Healthcare Needs 
 
Andrew J. Moore and Bernie Carter 
 
Moore is a Research Associate at Keele University in the United Kingdom. In his current work with the Arthritis 
Research UK Primary Care Centre, he is conducting research on how adults in later life manage to live well 
with chronic pain. His research interests include the role of space and place in the experience of chronic illness 
and aging (see Moore 2010). Carter is Professor of Children‘s Nursing at the University of Central Lancashire 
and Director of the Children‘s Nursing Research Unit, Alder Hey Children‘s NHS Foundation Trust. Her 
research considers transitions and disruptions in children‘s lives, for example, the impact of chronic and 
complex health-care needs on the lives of children and their families. She is also interested in the role that space 
and place play in children‘s lives as well as in the lives of their families and the health professionals providing 
care for the children. Contact: a.j.moore@cphc.keele.ac.uk; © 2012 Andrew J. Moore and Bernie Carter. 
 
 
ithin any research project, serendipity 
places a role. New lines of inquiry 
often emerge from post-fieldwork 
dialogue among team members. As 
we were completing work on a study of UK chil-
dren‘s and family‘s experiences of Community 
Children‘s Nursing Services (CCNS) (Carter & Co-
ad 2009; Department of Health 2011), our attention 
was drawn from service delivery to a more intense 
focus on the impact of the technology and equip-
ment that many children with complex needs rely 
on in their homes.  
For those parents we interviewed, we were 
usually invited into their living rooms. Parents fre-
quently referred to the technological aids (e.g., pos-
tural chairs and ventilators) and medical supplies 
(e.g., syringes and suction tubes) that they and their 
children relied on, revealing how ever-present this 
equipment was within the home. 
To reduce the impact of the functional technol-
ogy, manufacturers have designed some of the 
equipment to be more homelike and child-
friendly—for example, postural chairs that look like 
a ―wooden bumblebee.‖ Similarly, manufacturers 
have attempted to design roboticized assistive de-
vices to appear more discreet (to avoid attention), in 
an attempt to make them look less discrete (distinct 
from everything else) and more sympathetic to a 
normative aesthetic of home and family life.  
In other homes, ventilators and pumps whirred 
and labored, medications and distinctive smelling 
feeds were administered, and boxes of syringes and 
medication were stacked under the cot in which a 
child lay. The child‘s dependence on technology 
was visually, audibly, and often olfactorily appar-
ent. There was no hiding it from us as guests, and 
we do not suggest it should be hidden. Still, some 
parents did speak of trying to hide equipment—in 
cupboards, behind the sofa, or upstairs out of view. 
For the parents we spoke to, these objects 
framed the difference between their child and other 
children. One mother spoke of how the pediatric 
cradle her son lay in, next to the generic ―Moses 
basket‖ of his twin sister, became the focus of visi-
tors. They ceased to see him as a child and instead 
saw only the cradle that framed the difference be-
tween the two children. The mother‘s draping the 
cradle with a blanket to hide the stark difference 
between the cradles was an effort to remove the 
frame that the physical equipment presented—to 
pass the child as normal to visitors and to provide a 
W 
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―protective capsule‖ (Carnavale 2007, 10) control-
ling who sees and does not see the difference. 
The mother frankly admitted that the equip-
ment intruded into her home. She challenged us to 
―imagine it in your lounge—it‘s ugly‖ (we did im-
agine it and she was right: it was ugly in the sense it 
didn‘t fit). More importantly, she resignedly empha-
sized that such devices ―...make the child disabled.‖  
We agree with Carnevale (ibid.) that assistive 
technologies (AT) may be seen as stigmatic sym-
bols. We contend, however, that they may also be 
seen as that which does not belong—as something 
that is out of place in the home. At the same time, 
the child‘s life depends upon the existence of this 
thing itself, as life-giving and, therefore, appropriat-
ing. This was the tension we witnessed in the chil-
dren‘s homes. 
 
he question of being at home in the world as 
dwelling involves an ambivalent dialectic 
(Lindahl et al., 2003, 2005, 2006). For the 
child and adult, the taken-for-grantedness of one‘s 
relationship to AT sometimes renders it invisible 
and a bodily extension or part. At other times, AT 
becomes an object of direct attention as when it 
malfunctions or when visitors see it and the child‘s 
limitations become obvious in contrast to those who 
are more able. In its appearing, it re-appropriates the 
spaces of dwelling and at least partly alienates the 
child. 
This sense of alienation can also be felt by the 
child‘s caretakers. Though the continuation of their 
life does not directly depend upon AT in the way the 
child‘s does, ontologically, their continued existen-
tial security does, since their relationship with the 
child characterizes their being-at-home in the world. 
Thus, in their shifting visibility, ATs represent con-
tinual changes in one‘s attunement to the world, or 
to ―homelikeness‖ as Svenaeus (2001) aptly calls it. 
If, as Jager (1985, 219) suggests, total inhabita-
tion relies on full embodiment, then, arguably, this 
can never be provided by AT. Consequently, those 
who rely upon AT can never fully inhabit their 
world. The re-appropriation of alien things that real-
ly do not belong re-presents itself in ―the suffering 
of a ‗no‘ of things‖ (ibid.). 
The home spaces of families with technology-
dependent children are different from other family 
homes in that they are re-constructed around the 
child‘s condition and needs. The home space be-
comes an appropriated landscape: No longer a fami-
ly landscape but a landscape of care, ―like a mini 
hospital.‖ Home as it was is essentially changed, 
and the stories that parents told showed how this 
shift had resounding effects. 
Getting their child home from hospital repre-
sented the most important part of a socio-spatial re-
construction process that more often than not had 
begun a long time before the child‘s homecoming. 
Parents spoke of how the home felt empty without 
the child. Prior to the his or her homecoming, the 
dwelling was restructured in preparation for the 
child: a string of professional strangers wandering 
across and scrutinizing what is essentially sacred 
space. Home is anticipated in light of the passing 
through of nurses, therapists, installers, health and 
safety assessors, and representatives from social 
services.  
When the child returns, the home is complete 
but with the addition of new things in new places, 
and old things re-ordered or pushed out. Waves of 
new objects move in different directions, displacing 
older objects, routines, and a sense of belonging. 
Since children with complex health-care needs 
regularly move in and out of hospital, there are lim-
inal modes of existence between hospital and home. 
The identities of these two places meld as the fami-
ly tries to comprehend what has become hospital 
and what has become home. 
Home is part of a parent‘s identity as ―parent.‖ 
Any disorder in the home leads to the realization 
that home is no longer the same place. For some 
parents, this shift invokes the feeling that the home 
is ―not my home‖ anymore. In one sense, this ad-
mission is felt to be heretical, since getting home 
does not automatically mean that the parents feel at 
home. The event that necessitates a child‘s reliance 
on AT may be seen as presenting a biographical dis-
ruption to the parents of that child, and this disrup-
tion extends into the lived spaces and lived identi-
ties of the child‘s parents and siblings (Bury 1982). 
Children, their family, and friends become ex-
perts in the use and administration of medical tech-
T 
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nologies. The physical (the building and contents), 
social (family, friends and health professionals), and 
symbolic landscapes (the objects and rituals) of the 
home then start to reflect those of the place that all 
families wish to avoid—the hospital. In avoiding 
the hospital, the family‘s goal is a ―normal family 
life‖ in which the child feels included, cared for, 
and safe. Though medical technology enables this 
possibility, it remains incongruous and symbolic of 
the place they aim to avoid. For some parents, the 
lack of autonomy and control over the appropriation 
of the home space created resentment. 
 
he dialectical relationships with AT are pre-
sented in a series of studies by Lindahl and 
colleagues (2003, 2005, 2006), who suggest 
that home as a lived space is not an unreflective or 
taken-for-granted place for those families who rely 
on home AT. Lindahl‘s research with adults who 
rely on ventilators indicates that home is seen as a 
place of comfort, security, and well-being but also 
as a place of uncertainty and fragility. Relief charac-
terizes relationships with AT when they are per-
ceived as life-saving. At the same time, however, 
they are seen as an ―enemy,‖ provoking fear and 
feelings of a burdened life.  
While the home may feel safe, the need for AT 
for travel and encounters beyond the home can be 
both worrying and burdensome for parents. In one 
story we heard from parents, their child with a 
breathing tube went on a class trip to the zoo. He 
was accompanied by a care-giver trained to deal 
with emergencies. The child‘s wheelchair was 
equipped with oxygen, suction equipment, and 
emergency supplies. 
All was going well until the group arrived at 
the meerkat enclosure where the children became 
more animated and excited. In his enthusiasm, the 
child pulled at his breathing tube and hurled it to-
ward the nearest meerkat. The situation suddenly 
shifted to an emergency as the care-giver had to re-
place the tube. The medical equipment and the 
child‘s dependence on technology were instantly 
exposed, made visible and public. Though the new 
tube was quickly inserted, this event underlined the 
parents‘ anxieties about the potential for harm out-
side of the relative security of home. Despite these 
dangers, they were aware that home is a place of 
comings and goings rather than stayings and that if 
home is to be homelike, it can never be one-hundred 
percent risk free. 
 
eamon‘s concept of ―at-homeness‖ provides 
one interpretive framework for exploring how 
parents reflect on the lived experience of 
home. Seamon (1979) identified five prerequisites 
for a sense of at-homeness, or the feeling of being 
completely comfortable and secure in one‘s home: 
rootedness (a sense of familiarity and belonging); 
regeneration (the restorative function of place); at-
easeness (the freedom to be oneself); warmth (a 
friendly and supportive atmosphere); and appropri-
ation (a sense of possession and control). 
The presence of AT is a challenge particularly 
to appropriation and also affects at-easeness. The 
presence of AT is a reminder that the family does 
not have a choice and is not fully control of their 
home space. In addition, AT reminds parents of the 
fragility of their child‘s life. This is a source of un-
remitting anxiety, which one father described as liv-
ing ―a couple of rungs up the stress ladder.‖ Argua-
bly, this anxiety corrodes the anchor points of onto-
logical security, which Giddens (1990, 92) describes 
as ―the confidence that most human beings have in 
the continuity of their self-identity and in the con-
stancy of the surrounding social and material envi-
ronments of action.‖ Without AT, children would be 
required to live in hospital, or they would die. 
While the parents of the children in the CCN 
study were grateful for AT, they also saw it as bur-
densome in the way it transformed their lived expe-
rience of home as they had to restructure their lived 
space to accommodate the technology. Regardless 
of whether such technology is designed well, it 
might be that the individuals and families who rely 
on AT will experience persistent ambivalence to-
ward it, being both simultaneously grateful and re-
sentful. This oscillating relationship will always 
mean that at-homeness for these families remains a 
precariously balanced existential state, character-
ized not by questions related to one‘s belonging but 
by questions related to fitting into the world, where 
AT must ―fit‖ into time and place (lived time and 









tionality), and into the child‘s body, facilitated by 
the skills of others (lived body). 
 
e offer no solution here. More than likely, 
designers cannot make discreet that 
which is discrete and unsympathetic to a 
homelike setting, though more attentive aesthetic 
designs could possibly enable a more sympathetic 
fit with domestic environments. What our findings 
do bring to light are the difficulties that families 
face in their own homes. We should perhaps be 
more appreciative of just how far the challenges of 
chronic illness and profound disablement penetrate 
into the lives of families, affecting their very being-
in-the-world on every level—physically, psycholog-
ically, emotionally, socially, spiritually, and, of 
course, environmentally. 
There will always be a tension between medical 
technology, health needs, and the aesthetic of the 
―family home,‖ at least for the parents and care-
givers of those who are technology-dependent. Pro-
fessionals should recognize that compromise is re-
quired in that keeping a child at home means that 
that home is subsequently changed. Some families 
will be able to deal with the situation by reorganiz-
ing space or hiding away and storing technology in 
cupboards and boxes. In other situations, families 
without such possibilities will deal with the situa-
tion however best they can. 
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 few years ago, a colleague and I were 
sitting on a park bench on the grounds of 
the Prague Castle. This colleague is 
Scandinavian and, as we talked about the 
beauty of Prague, she explained that she measures 
all landscape beauty according to her own 
hometown and its surroundings. She finds those 
landscapes most beautiful that are like her child-
hood landscape. Her remark struck me as an in-
sightful commentary on the normative power of 
place [1]. 
In thinking more about this issue, I was drawn 
to consider the relationship of body to home and, 
specifically, to Gaston Bachelard‘s descriptions of 
the places of the childhood home (Bachelard 1969). 
Bachelard‘s account can be more explicitly theo-
rized through Martin Heidegger‘s analysis of dwell-
ing and Edmund Husserl‘s distinctions between 
homeworld and alienworld. 
In what follows, I consider the interconnections 
between place and body, followed by an exploration 
of Bachelard‘s imaginative descriptions. Next, I 
move into a more theoretical analysis of the func-
tion of dwelling and home in the works of Ed Casey 
and Martin Heidegger. Finally, I provide a function-
al analysis of these themes through the Husserlian 
notions of homeworld and alienworld. 
 
Body and Place 
Yi-Fu Tuan claims that, although divisions and 
measurements of space differ from culture to cul-
ture, two things are constant as fundamental princi-
ples of spatial organization and experience: ―the 
posture and structure of the human body, and the 
relations (whether close or distant) between human be-
ings‖ (Tuan 1977, 34). In part, this means that body and 
place are inseparable. The fact that we are embodied 
creatures means that we take up space. But more than 
that, we inhabit a place through and in our lived bodies. 
On a basic level, we can see the relationship be-
tween the body and place in the idea of the home. When 
we inhabit a house, we say we live there. We say ―come 
back to my place.‖ It is a space that is intimate and into 
which we usually only allow those whom we consider 
family or friends. The house is where we develop a cer-
tain style of acting in the world. In the way it is deco-
rated and arranged, it reflects our character. 
But the house, too, arranges us much as any build-
ing arranges us but in a much more fundamental, de-
terminate way. Any time we enter a building, we come 
under its sway. Our movements must be attuned to the 
building as we find our way down hallways, as we lo-
cate bathrooms, and so forth. The building opens a par-
ticular world to us. 
We are motivated in various ways by the building 
as well—motivated to look out the windows or not, de-
pending upon whether they are accessible to us. Moti-
vated to linger or not, depending upon whether the 
chairs invite or discourage lounging. We are often 
forced, perhaps not merely motivated, to walk the long 
way through the store past all kinds of goods that might 
catch our eye, rather than having a straight shot to the 
checkout aisle with our more meager purchase. 
We most often are not cognizant of these motiva-
tions, but bodily respond to them without really think-
ing. These ways in which we bodily respond to the built 
environment do not disappear once we step outside. We 
are in the world in the same way as we find ourselves in 
the built environment, not only in the way that the built 
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environment includes the sidewalks and streets, 
light poles, and electrical wires but also in the ways 
we are motivated by the soft grass in the park or the 
need to avoid the fire ant hill. These things we often 
do with complete neglect of our embodiedness. We 
move through the world very much buffeted by its 
pre-givenness. 
 There must be one cautionary word here. We do 
not want to think of the body exclusively as some-
thing that is passively acted upon by the environ-
ment. Because the body is a lived body, it is situat-
ing as well as situated. For phenomenologists such 
as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, the body 
is in the world, but not as water is in a glass [2]. The 
world and the places we inhabit do not contain our 
bodies. Body and world are intertwined, making 
place integral to body and vice versa. The body is 
what allows us to move in the world and to respond 
to the pull of things that interest us. 
As Merleau-Ponty (1962, 340) suggests, ―It is 
one and the same thing for us to perceive our body 
and to perceive our situation in a certain physical 
and human setting, for our body is nothing but that 
very situation in so far as it is realized and actual-
ized.‖ Thus, it is through the body that we inhabit 
our dwelling places, since it is the body that devel-
ops the habits and memories that allow it to take up 
the place of dwelling. The body is how we get our 
bearings and orient ourselves in a place. 
But my own body is also only given to me 
through the place it inhabits. As Eva Simms (2008, 
42) explains, ―the body as mine is given to me not 
in itself and through the recognition of the bound-
edness of its skin but as an element in the equation 
of action space... The body becomes predictable in 
encounters with the things and people of its action 
space, and particular gestures and experiences re-
peat and sediment in the flesh.‖ The body is how we 
make a place our own, and the central place of our 
embodiedness is our home.  
 
The Priority of Home 
Gaston Bachelard‘s The Poetics of Space is unique 
in its poetical treatment of the childhood home. Be-
ginning with the dwelling‘s cellars and darker, se-
cretive places, Bachelard explores their impact on 
the childhood psyche. For Bachelard the home rep-
resents the ―protected intimacy‖ of the houses of our 
dreams as well as those of our reality. He describes it 
simply as ―inhabited space‖—as ―the non-I that protects 
the I‖ (Bachelard 1969, 5). 
Bachelard also recognizes that the home is inti-
mately connected to memory. In fact, he understands 
the home as retaining our past and opening up an im-
memorial domain. He links this retention of the past 
with daydreaming, which he insists makes possible the 
memories of prior dwellings. As he remarks,  
 
the places in which we have experienced daydreaming reconstitute 
themselves in a new daydream, and it is because our memories of 
former dwelling-places are relived as daydreams that these dwell-
ing-places of the past remain in us for all time (ibid., 6). 
 
Further, Bachelard credits the house with the 
preservation of human identity. Because it is the first 
world that a child encounters, the hostility of the ―ex-
ternal‖ world is something that is experienced second-
arily. He acknowledges, however, that the house is 
more than a simple repository for memories. It is ―phys-
ically inscribed in us. It is a group of organic habits‖ 
(ibid., 14). He explains that the originary house of our 
childhood is one that would not trip us up on a visit af-
ter decades of absence. We would automatically, physi-
cally respond to it as we once did, skipping the creaky 
step, raising our hand just the right height for the light 
switch, moving about it with the same gestures we once 
did: 
 
In short, the house we were born in has engraved within us the 
hierarchy of the various functions of inhabiting that particular 
house, and all the other houses are but variations on a fundamental 
theme (ibid., 15). 
 
 Edward Casey (1993) describes the childhood 
home in similar ways. For Casey, however, what is im-
portant is the role of the home as hearth, as situation for 
living and as a foundation for identity. Who we are has 
to do with where we are from. We have a tendency to 
identify ourselves according to the places in which we 
dwell. Casey adopts this term from Martin Heidegger, 
who describes home in terms of our ability to dwell. 
Dwelling is a basic character of being and entails a wish 
to belong to the environment and to be at home. 
Further drawing upon Heidegger‘s notion of dwell-
ing, Casey argues that a building becomes a home from 
practices of cultivation. In his essay ―Building Dwelling 
Thinking,‖ Heidegger (2008, 349) suggests that: 
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to be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It 
means to dwell…It also means at the same time to cherish and 
protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to 
cultivate the vine (Heidegger 2008, 349). 
 
But surely, we think, Heidegger isn‘t romanti-
cizing to such a degree that he thinks in order to 
dwell we need to go back to an era when each of us 
cultivated the land? Although romanticizing, 
Heidegger is not doing so to quite such an extent. 
Rather, he speaks of cultivating in terms of the car-
ing that is related to culture. 
Heidegger is underscoring the inseparability of 
dwelling and building, but he understands building 
as constructing and cultivating, the making of edi-
fices and architecture as well as the cultivation of 
culture. Both of these activities, constructing and 
cultivating, are carried out in terms of dwelling. For 
building is dwelling and ―remains for man‘s every-
day experience that which is from the outset ‗habit-
ual‘—we inhabit it‖ (ibid., 349). For Heidegger, the 
quality of human life depends upon how we are able 
to dwell. 
And this takes Heidegger back to the idea of 
home. According to Vincent Vycinas, home for 
Heidegger is ―an overwhelming, inexchangeable 
something to which we were subordinate and from 
which our way of life was oriented and directed, 
even if we had left our home many years before‖ 
[3]. Home is fundamental to our identity and com-
munal belonging. Home is the point of departure for 
all experiences in the world. 
Moreover, this home is primordial. Geographer 
Eric Dardel suggests that: 
 
Before any choice, there is this place which we have not cho-
sen, where the very foundation of our earthly existence and 
human condition establishes itself. We can change places, 
move, but this is still to look for a place, for this we need as a 
base to set down Being and to realize our possibilities—a here 
from which the world discloses itself, a there to which we can 
go [4]. 
 
The power of this primordial place seems not to 
be in dispute, but exactly how does the home func-
tion in this primordiality? Before we consider that 
question, I want to draw attention to a difficulty 
with these accounts of home that we need to keep in 
mind. Bachelard has been criticized, by feminists in 
particular, who suggest that the childhood home cannot 
always be viewed as such a positive place. It is fre-
quently, and probably more so for women, a place of 
abuse and fear [5]. Like any other experience of home, 
this abuse and fear writes itself on the body and estab-
lishes a style of constitution that cannot easily be over-
come. 
I agree with much of the feminist critique, but I do 
not think that critique inhibits the claims that I am mak-
ing here about the normative power of home. If home is 
a place of abuse and fear, then other places too will be 
approached initially from that perspective of lack of 
safety until one can be persuaded that the place is oth-
erwise. While Bachelard‘s and Casey‘s descriptions 
may be limited in that they represent a romanticization 
of the childhood home, they are nevertheless tapping 
into the normative role that home plays for each of us. 
To claim, as I am doing here, that home has a nor-
mative power means that encounters with other places, 
other homes, places of work, public places, and so 
forth, are measured according to the place of home. 
This does not necessitate that home be a positive place, 
a place of daydreaming as Bachelard would have it, or a 
place we wish to return to once we have left it [6]. 
What it does mean is that our bodily encounters in other 
places are stylized according to the home‘s normative 
stylizing of our bodies. Abuse at home writes itself on 
the body in such a way that places where such abuse is 
not present, particularly places that we might call home, 
may feel uncannily safe but also anxiously on the brink 
of being unsafe. 
Our default expectation in such cases would be of 
places as being unsafe if our bodies have been habituat-
ed to pain and abuse. We may move carefully, unwilling 
to disrupt another in that place for fear of home-like 
reprisals. We may shrink from touch, even where touch 
is caring and loving, due to an expectation of bodily 
harm. Any place that disrupts that expectation would be 
experienced as not normal, as bodily awkward [7]. 
 
The Structure of the Homeworld 
What these theorists are getting at in describing a famil-
iar here against which we oppose a there is what Ed-
mund Husserl describes as a distinction between home-
world and alienworld. Our homeworld is a unity of 
sense that is manifest in a pre-givenness of the things of 
the world that constitute the norm by which we judge 
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other worlds and by which the pre-givenness of oth-
er worlds becomes given (Steinbock 1995, 154) [8]. 
In other words, the homeworld structures expe-
rience itself. It is pre-given in the sense that we are 
not engaged in a conscious constitution of the 
homeworld or what is most familiar. We engage 
with it in its familiarity in a kind of absent way. We 
are not always attentive to it, particularly not as 
homeworld or as normative. It is the world of our 
habitualities. But more than that, it is the world that 
has written itself upon our bodies in such a way that 
our very movement through this world is structured 
according to it. The ways in which we move and the 
givenness of the things of the world are all ground-
ed in our homeworld. 
As Anthony Steinbock (ibid., 164) notes, ―we 
actually carry with us the structure of our terrain in 
the structure of our lived-bodies, in our typical 
comportment and in our practices.‖ In using ―ter-
rain,‖ Steinbock stresses the actual physical ele-
ment, not just the cultural practices of a place. The 
physicality of the world of home has a great deal to 
do with the cultural practices, the narratives, and the 
rituals that contribute to our constitution of the 
world [9].  
To say that we live in a physical environment 
that shapes us is too simple, though.  All people of 
the same homeworld do not constitute the world in 
the same way. It is not that the homeworld functions 
as a rigid structure for constitution. Rather, the 
homeworld serves as a ground in conjunction with 
our approach to the environment. The environment 
of a poet is different from that of the profiteer, 
which is different from that of the naturalist, even if 
they are all experiencing the same place. What they 
see and how they see it is quite diverse. Where one 
person may see beauty and is perhaps focused on 
color and light, another sees potential and is perhaps 
focused on structure and accessibility. 
What is implicit in Husserl‘s notion of home-
world is that this varied constitution of the same 
environment has to do in part with the normative 
power of the homeworld. We become attentive to 
certain elements of any place due to the habitualities 
of our homeworld. Again, Steinbock suggests that 
the familiarity of home: 
 
has more to do with the way things in the terrain typically behave, 
which in turn efficaciously sketches out a range of future com-
portment, prefiguring this rather than that, highlighting one prac-
tice, dimming down another (ibid., 165). 
 
The things within the surrounding world are there-
by colored by the environment. They are ―saturated 
with normative significance‖ depending on the practic-
es that compose the environment. That normative sig-
nificance also makes itself felt at the level of the lived 
body. The environment calls forth a style of comport-
ment toward it. This comportment is not one‘s com-
portment toward this particular place but simply one‘s 
comportment. It is one‘s way of being, living, and en-
gaging in the place that is home, but also in the place 
that is alien. 
 Homeworld is always co-relative with alienworld, 
and these concepts bring with them the notions of nor-
mal and abnormal [10]. While bodily habits, traditions, 
and rituals are being established through the constitu-
tion of the homeworld, that which is not these habits, 
that which stands over against these traditions, is also 
being established. In eating with fork and spoon, we do 
not eat with fingers or bread or chopsticks. 
At the same time, experiences of alienworlds make 
the homeworld more explicit to us in its familiarity. 
Homeworld in its normality can be so close to us as to 
be unrecognizable until drawn into relief by an alien-
world experience. Consider the mundane experience of 
crossing the street. Until one has gone to a country 
where people drive on the opposite side of the road, one 
may not even realize the way in which one‘s bodily ac-
tivity is habituated to look first left and then right be-
fore crossing the street. Once one is confronted with 
traffic moving on opposite sides of the street, one real-
izes that this quite normal bodily habit is in fact dan-
gerous in the alienworld. One can try to change that 
habit, but it is awkward, at least at first, and may be-
come easier or even habit, but the behavior is still alien. 
Even after years of having changed the pattern, there 
can be occasions when one ―forgets‖ and reverts to the 
old ways. There are, of course, degrees of these kinds 
of differences that make themselves apparent at a bodi-
ly level between homeworld and alienworld.  
 We can also understand how this influences the 
constitution of the world. In my habit of looking first 
one direction, then the other before crossing the street, I 
am also used to constituting a streetscape in a particular 
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way that, at least for me, doesn‘t include carts, rick-
shaws, horses, or throngs of bicycles. It is quite pos-
sible, then, that when these types of vehicles are on 
the scene, I do not even see them. They are not giv-
en to me in my constitution of the streetscape until I 
am pulled up short by them, or have to jump out of 
the way.  
We cannot say definitively when these habits 
are thoroughly sedimented, but we do know that it 
happens very early in life. As Yi-Fu Tuan (1977) 
explains, there is tacit knowledge of alienworld 
which is necessary for knowledge of homeworld. 
Thus the two are co-constituted. We can also see 
how this co-constitution transpires developmentally. 
In considering pre-givenness and givenness in terms 
of developmental issues, we recognize that the 
depth or intensity of the influence of homeworld 
can vary from individual to individual. 
Not all individuals develop at the same rate or 
with the same specificity. Yet we can see from em-
pirical research that infants gain a sense of space 
and orientation in the first few months of life. As 
that sense develops and the infant changes from be-
ing primarily prone (at least in Western cultures) to 
an upright, mobile being, the foundational experi-
ences get overlaid with the additional evidence of 
distance and height, expanse and boundaries (Tuan 
1977, 20–33). 
At a very young age, roughly two to two and a 
half, children are able to distinguish between 
―home‖ and ―outside‖ as areas of play, but they do 
not get more specific than that and certain poles that 
are more familiar seem to hold more significance 
for the child—for example, ―here‖ as opposed to 
―there‖ (ibid., 25).  
Other kinds of situatedness do not develop until 
later. As Tuan indicates, children of four or five are 
not necessarily aware of how to get from one famil-
iar place to another, since they have not yet ac-
quired the habit of making mental note of the loca-
tions of things or landmarks. Child development 
specialist Arnold Gesell tells us that a child under-
stands ―where‖ at the age of two or two and a half, 
but that the sense of place becomes more specific as 
a child gets older [11]. 
Given these variations in development, it is 
possible to recognize that the role of place and 
home will vary in intensity depending upon the static 
nature of one‘s home. The argument remains, nonethe-
less, that whatever is static and can become habitual for 
the child serves as a homeworld ground of experience. 
The constitution of homeworld and alienworld is 
constantly transpiring while being reconstituted and cri-
tiqued. It is a dynamic process of transference of 
homeworld from generation to generation. It does not 
behoove us to think of the homeworld as a static norm. 
It is a way of constituting that is constantly open to the 
newness of each constitutive act, but each constitutive 
act stems from the homeworld/alienworld relationship. 
We are constantly in the act of generating the home-
world through the repetition and re-constitution of the 
tradition we take up within the homeworld. 
And when we encounter some place other than 
homeworld, its alien qualities manifest in the environ-
ment, and pulling me up short in my habits, reveal the 
very normative power of the homeworld, which is the 
place where my body is most habituated [12]. It is not 
that the homeworld is thereby found to be ethically su-
perior. Rather, it is that any other place is more or less 
alien by relation to and in constitution with the home-
world. I am not at home when I am bodily uneasy, 
when my habits do not fit or do not yield the results I 
expect. 
This does not mean that the alienworld is lesser or 
worse but that it is not home. In fact, I may be all the 
more attracted to the alienworld precisely because it is 
not home. It may seem exciting and mysterious, or even 
more welcoming if my own home is a place of violence 
or neglect. But this doesn‘t change the role of home as 
home. The homeworld provides a normative power in 
that it is familiar and the hallmark by which we meas-
ure any other place and where our experiences are typi-
cal and are in conformity with our bodily expectations.  
 
Homeworld and Normative Power 
Husserl speaks of normativity in terms of the ―normal‖ 
relation between the lived body and the environing 
world. On this account, normality is not, as it might be 
for the sciences, exactly the same for all experiencing 
subjects. Remember the poet, profiteer, and naturalist 
and their differing constitutions of the same place. The 
poet sees the beauty and mystery of the forest. The 
profiteer sees the business opportunity of lumber. The 
naturalist sees a habitat to be preserved. Since Husserl 
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views the lived body as a constituting element in 
experience, it must play a vital role in what is per-
ceived as normal or alien and abnormal. 
This means that the blind person‘s normal is 
different from the seeing person‘s normal and the 5‘ 
1‘‘ person‘s normal is different from the 6‘ 2‘‘ per-
son‘s normal. Normality is a matter of constitution 
that includes the lived body of each experiencing 
subject. How, given this highly individualistic sense 
of normality, could anything be viewed as abnor-
mal? Abnormality is viewed as a rupture or discon-
tinuity of experience. When I pick up my coffee cup 
and prepare to take a sip, I first blow on the hot cof-
fee to cool it. As I tip the cup to my lips, I suddenly 
am startled by the meeting of my lips with a cold 
liquid. My experience of the coffee cup is disrupted 
by an unexpected sensation that alters my entire 
constitution of the cup as a cup of coffee. The expe-
rience is discontinuous. 
On the other hand, the experience can be dis-
rupted or discontinuous due to an abnormality of the 
lived body. Again, we are not talking about some 
kind of idealized body but one‘s own lived body: 
When one has a cold, for instance, and can‘t taste or 
smell the coffee, or when one has a limb that is 
asleep and can‘t grasp things with it or stand up. 
These kinds of discontinuities can be incorporated 
into a continuous experience as one‘s constitution of 
the environing world changes to accommodate these 
experiences. 
So, when the cold liquid touches my lips, I 
don‘t determine that I was entirely incorrect in pick-
ing up the cup as I do every morning. I simply de-
termine that this morning, something is slightly dif-
ferent. I focus my attention on the liquid in the cup 
to determine that it is in fact water and not coffee. I 
set the cup back down and may reach for it again in 
a minute or two for a sip of water. It has become my 
―new normal‖ that allows my experience to be con-
tinuous. When I have a cold, my ―new normal‖ is 
perhaps understanding that I can‘t really smell 
things appropriately, or I can‘t hear myself speak as 
I would normally do. For a time, these situations 
become simply the ways in which I constitute my 
experiences and incorporate them into my normal 
approach to the world. Usually, my new normal 
lasts only for a brief time, and I return to the normality 
of homeworld soon enough. 
In some cases the ―new normal‖ is not so easily 
achieved, as, for instance, in the cases of the phantom 
limb and the anosognosia that Merleau-Ponty described 
in such detail [13]. For the person suffering from either 
of these syndromes, the incorporation of a drastic bodi-
ly change such as a loss or paralysis of a limb becomes 
exceedingly difficult and something the person rejects, 
sometimes indefinitely. These individuals still attempt 
to engage in the same projects they would have en-
gaged in before their loss, or complain of the pain of a 
limb that they no longer have. But, in most cases, they 
relearn their bodily engagement in the world without 
the use of that limb. To what degree this becomes ac-
cepted by them as ―normal‖ varies considerably. 
What these examples underscore is precisely the 
way in which the habituated body becomes the founda-
tion for constituting the homeworld and allows us to 
question to what degree that which is alien can ever be 
incorporated into home. If we claim that the homeworld 
is normative, then what transpires for those who are 
forced out of their homeworld, or who choose to leave 
their homeworld? What is the experience of the alien-
world? Can the alienworld ever become a replacement 
homeworld? If there is this kind of conception of a 
―new‖ normal, then wouldn‘t that mean that any alien 
world would be incorporated and eventually would be-
come a new homeworld? 
Interestingly, Husserl suggests that, in spite of the 
multitude of homeworlds, there is still a foundational 
unified world of perceptual experience—the perceptual 
world. This is the world of pure perceptual experience 
and is what he calls the ―lifeworld a priori.‖ All home-
worlds are grounded in the singular lifeworld. This, for 
Husserl, is an eidetic structure that functions as that 
which is neither experienceable nor relative but grounds 
both the relative homeworlds and the experiences 
thereof. 
It is not as if in going to London, I have been 
transported to Mars. Even physical environments that 
are more radically different than London is from, say,  
the small-town American South still share the lifeworld. 
If we try to think of the most divergent environments 
we can, perhaps New York City in comparison to Sa-
moa in the South Pacific where the people live in pole 
sheds and use sea toilets, we notice that as alien as New 
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York City would be to someone from Samoa, or as 
Samoa would be to someone from New York City, 
elements of a shared life world are still evident. 
Constitution of discrete objects against a back-
ground and other such basic constitutive elements 
remain the same. 
But does this mean that eventually every alien-
world simply becomes absorbed into the home-
world? Is that what is happening in our globalized 
world?  
 
Alienworld to Homeworld? 
We might object to the notion of the homeworld as 
having normative power by referring to those who 
are transported to a new place permanently. Think 
of immigrants or ex-patriot communities abroad. 
Surely, those people who have lived in a place for 
several years have adopted many of the customs and 
the local language. They have come to respond to 
the weather, the altitude, the physical aspects of the 
place much as a native would. 
Can we not claim that such a place is a new 
homeworld? Has the alienworld not taken the place 
of the homeworld and the homeworld become al-
ien? In some ways, perhaps, yes. But not wholesale. 
Instead, I would claim (with Steinbock) that due to 
the co-relative nature of the homeworld and alien-
world, the transformation of alienworld into home-
world can never be complete. The fact that both 
worlds are grounded in the lifeworld a priori is what 
makes possible the experience of both worlds at all. 
If the alienworld were not grounded in the lifeworld 
a priori it simply would not be experienceable as 
world. The lifeworld makes it possible for me to 
experience the alien and perhaps even to ―feel at 
home‖ abroad, but the home abroad will only be 
measured as ―homelike‖ because of the asymmetry 
of the originally co-relative relationship between 
homeworld and alienworld.  
 Let me give a brief example of how this con-
flict between homeworld and alienworld is manifest 
in quite material ways, not just in the narrative, the 
traditions, and the myths of a cultural world [14]. 
Having grown up in Nebraska, my alienworld is my 
current home in the state of Georgia. I have lived in 
Georgia for over ten years—long enough, one might 
think, to get used to Georgian ways. And perhaps in 
some respects I have. I now drink sweet tea, understand 
the best way to eat grits (although I still don‘t like 
them), and recognize a good biscuit when I see one. I 
can occasionally be heard to use the phrase ―y‘all,‖ and 
to focus my ideas for beach vacations on Florida. 
But, it‘s the surrounding world that still feels alien. 
In Nebraska I enjoyed digging in the dirt as a child. 
Each spring we would make tours of the yard looking to 
see which bulbs would come back, getting excited at 
the first signs of growth. We did very little in the yard, 
actually—just enough to keep the rose bushes bloom-
ing, a few tomato plants alive, and the irises and lily-of-
the-valley in shape. 
In Georgia, the climate and landscape are very dif-
ferent. The air in Georgia is alive with growth. It 
weighs heavily upon one‘s skin. Rather than coaxing 
things to grow in the yard, I am constantly hacking 
away at bushes, brutally pulling up plants as they sprout 
anywhere and everywhere. It is impossible to keep 
things from growing. While this may seem like a mun-
dane example, it points to what is so fundamental about 
this discussion. 
Not only have my approach and my habits had to 
change, but the very way in which I conceive of myself 
and the surrounding world has had to change in quite 
radical ways too. I can no longer view myself as the 
encourager and caretaker of nature. I am instead virtual-
ly at war with nature. Being interested in a sustainable 
garden requires constant vigilance against the natural 
tendencies of my garden. 
Likewise, the world of nature is no longer consti-
tuted as the neutral territory of a Nebraska yard, but is 
the overwhelming and even dangerous realm of my 
Georgia naturescape. With a yard full of 70-foot pine 
trees, we live with the anxiety that a tree will fall in a 
storm and smash our house or worse yet, kill us in our 
beds as happened to a neighbor. In Nebraska, trees are a 
luxury, not a danger. The Georgian world is alienworld 
in its very landscape, not just as a cultural background. 
Will Georgia ever become my homeworld? I think 
not. I will continue to develop ways to cope, but it will 
always be in co-constitution with the more primordial 
and normalizing experience of my Nebraska home-
world. It still does not come naturally to me to consti-
tute growing things as weeds, to pull them up when I 
find them in the yard. There will always be something a 
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bit uncanny. The pull of the homeworld will always 
be there. 
And homeworld is not just about the traditions 
that get translated through the myths and the stories. 
It is about the embodied relationship to an environ-
ing world. We cannot so blithely separate the cul-
tural from the environmental, since the cultural is 
frequently what it is precisely because of the envi-
ronmental. Skiing is very much a part of the cultural 
world in Colorado with the equipment, language, 
and traditional events that surround it. This is not so 
in Georgia for very obvious reasons of environment, 
climate, and thus culture. On the other hand, gar-
dening for native Georgians is a mark of one‘s be-
longing. Not so in the mountain towns of Colorado, 
since it is almost impossible to get garden vegeta-
bles to grow.  
 So, I don‘t think there can be a real fear of al-
ienworlds dissolving into homeworld. Globalization 
cannot eliminate the diversity of environment, land-
scape, and embodied life. While some of these ele-
ments are perhaps more under threat than others, it 
is virtually impossible that the co-constitution of 
homeworld and alienworld could ever be replaced 
with simple lifeworld.  
 I want to reiterate that I am not suggesting that 
the homeworld is better than the alienworld. In 
many cases, where one feels comfortable may in 
fact be a place completely opposite from the home-
world, but I would suggest that such is the case in 
large part due to the experience of the homeworld. 
If the homeworld is a place of danger, anxiety, or 
abuse, then one may in fact be more comfortable in 
the alienworld, but the alienworld is still judged on 
the basis of the homeworld. Generally speaking, 
homeworld is formative for the ways in which we 
constitute the surrounding world, since it is forma-
tive for one‘s bodily habits and style of constitution. 
 
Implications of Homeworld 
Having discovered here that the homeworld is so 
fundamental to the very embodied nature of human 
existence, to our ways of perceiving and knowing, 
we naturally wonder what the ramifications of this 
are. Why should it matter that the homeworld has 
this kind of normative effect for perceiving and 
knowing? Who cares? 
In concluding, I want to raise a few issues for 
which this investigation is important. There are ethical 
concerns that could come under scrutiny given this 
framework. For instance, how might we deal differently 
with those persons who are displaced from their home-
world by war or famine? In attempting to place these 
people, we might take into consideration the environ-
ment and climate, the environmental landscape where 
these people could be most ―at home‖ in the alien 
world, all the while knowing that no alienworld will 
ever be homeworld for them. 
We might also reconsider policies regarding adop-
tion of children from one country to another. Is it right 
or proper to remove a child of two or older, for in-
stance, from its homeworld and bring that child to a 
place that is utterly alien in landscape and tradition? 
Think of the lost boys of Sudan who were taken to 
Minnesota, Pittsburgh, New York City and several other 
American cities. These places are so utterly unlike their 
homeworld in climate and landscape and tradition. Is 
such a move justified by the ―good‖ it will do those 
boys? Is there no other alternative?  
Finally, I do wonder whether it is inherently con-
servative to preserve notions of homeworld and alien-
world in this era of time-space compression where the 
world is shrinking. I think the answer that Husserl has 
helped us to see is that, regardless of how small the 
ground-earth is, the homeworld will always arise in 
conjunction with an alienworld and that the preserva-
tion of these differences is not to be viewed as negative 
or hostile but as necessary for the transference of cul-
ture and tradition. 
 So, while it may seem simple enough to suggest 
that our aesthetic taste is in large part dictated by the 
landscape in which we grew up and which carries our 
cultures and traditions within, it is a much bigger thing 
to suggest that the landscape carries more than aesthetic 
norms with it. It carries the very normative power of 
constitution of the world at all. The very way in which I 
move my body and the very elements of the landscape 
salient to me have everything to do with the normative 
power of my homeworld. Or perhaps, to return to 
Heidegger, we can see that the desire for home calls us 











1. The concept of normativity will be explained through-
out but, in general, I use the concept with respect to a founda-
tional standard to which other places are compared in terms of 
our embodied constitution of world. It is not meant to reflect 
an average or an optimum but that which serves as a founda-
tion for one‘s typical constitution of the world, one‘s style of 
being in the world. 
2. For more on their notions of body, see Husserl 1989, 
vol. 2, especially sections 36–44, pp. 152–170; Heidegger 
1962, pp. 79–80; and Merleau-Ponty 1962, especially part I, 
pp. 90–92.  
3. Vycinas 1961, p. 84, as quoted in Relph 1976, p. 39. 
4. As quoted in Relph 1976, p. 41. 
5. See for example Price 2002. 
6. For a more contemporary perpetuation of this kind of 
Bachelardian view, see Jacobson 2009.  Jacobson describes 
the home in terms of daydreaming, security, and relaxation. I 
do not claim such to be the case. Familiarity does not neces-
sarily mean comfort or security. The home does write itself on 
the body in terms of the body‘s development of habits and a 
style of being in the world, however, and on this point Jacob-
son and I agree. 
7. What this also draws into question is the predominant 
view of home as a place of refuge, a place ―inside‖ that fends 
off the ―outside.‖ By using notions of embodied normativity, 
we can recognize that what becomes normal, habituated, em-
bodied being for one is not at all the same for another and it 
may not be at all a secure ―inside.‖ The language of ―inside‖ 
and ―outside‖ leads to misunderstanding as does the language 
of security and refuge when speaking of the home place. It is 
home through its normative power by being the foundation 
that is most primary for our embodied habitual being in the 
world. It is a position of familiarity, but this does not equate to 
refuge, safety, or other romanticized notions.  
8. Husserl (1966) explains that ―pre-given‖ refers to 
those things that exercise an affective pull upon us, while that 
which is ―given‖ is such that we are attentive to it in a more 
active way. We focus on a thing, we pay attention to its mean-
ing given to us. See Husserl 1966. 
9. Notice that homeworld can equally apply to those who 
are homeless, those who are nomadic, or those who have vary-
ing degrees of static home life. It does not only refer to the 
semi-permanent structure of a house. Military children, for 
instance, who do not stay more than two years in any one 
place have a kind of moving homeworld since, for them, we 
could say the built environment has a certain precedence be-
cause it is more static—the military base remains largely the 
same even though the bases may be in various corners of the 
world. 
10. Husserl does not mean ―normal‖ and ―abnormal‖ to 
carry any ethical significance. They carry normative signifi-
cance simply in terms of one‘s habituated engagement with 
the world. 
11. Gesell 1950, p. 121, as quoted in Tuan 1977, p. 210. 
12. Again, homeworld is not necessarily a place of comfort in 
the usual sense of the term. In cases of abuse or neglect, the body 
is habituated to the abuse and neglect such that a place of safety, a 
place devoid of abuse, feels strange or fragile as opposed to the 
―usual‖ feeling of anxiety or fear or pain. 
13. See Merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 84–02. 
14. In Crisis of European Sciences (1936), Husserl focuses 
precisely on this notion of narrative and language in the transfer-
ence of homeworld across generations. There are also elements in 
that text, however, that allude to the primacy of place. Those ele-
ments have generally not been the focus of secondary-source 
commentary and are the elements I would like to focus upon. 
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